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Trading Privacy for Angry Birds: A Call for Courts to 
Reevaluate Privacy Expectations in Modern Smartphones 
Jeremy Andrew Ciarabellini* 
“That the individual shall have full protection in person and in 
property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been found 
necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent of 
such protection. Political, social, and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, 
grows to meet the demands of society.”1 
 
“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at 
the expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worth-
while. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy 
that new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to 
this development as inevitable.”2 
 
“There is nothing concealed that will not be disclosed, or hidden 
that will not be made known. What you have said in the dark will be 
heard in the daylight, and what you have whispered in the ear in the in-
ner rooms will be proclaimed from the roofs.”3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Of all the smartphone uses, the calling function is probably used the 
least. Rather, individuals more commonly use their smartphone for surf-
ing the web, checking Facebook, and playing games. Highlighting the 
“smart” in smartphone, these phones often know more about their users’ 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., United States Politics and 
Government, University of Puget Sound. I would like to thank my wife for all of her love and sup-
port as this Note stole me away from home for many hours. 
 1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 
(1890). 
 2. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 3. Luke 12:2–3 (New International Version). 
1492 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1491 
daily activities than the users. Without requiring any sort of input, 
smartphones can tell the user how many steps they walk each day, when 
it is time to leave for work (also, of course, determining the traveling 
time with the most up-to-date traffic reports), and when an item recently 
ordered on Amazon will be delivered. Smartphone users may instinctive-
ly know that they could dig into their phones’ settings and turn off these 
features. They may also know that if their phones are telling them infor-
mation about their daily activities, they are likely sharing that same in-
formation with third parties—targeted advertisements come to mind. Of 
course, all of the downloaded “apps” had some sort of agreement that the 
user probably did not read and just clicked “yes.” The reality is that peo-
ple enjoy the conveniences offered by smartphones and give little 
thought to any privacy implications. In practice, it seems smartphone 
users are willing to trade their privacy to play Angry Birds. 
First introduced to the public in 1983,4 cell phones have evolved to 
now allow average citizens to carry internet-connected computers in their 
pockets.5 With such rapid technology advancement, it is unsurprising that 
the legal system has yet to establish a consistent privacy-based jurispru-
dence when it comes to smartphones and government searches.6 Current-
ly, courts are examining governmental searches of private smartphones 
under the Fourth Amendment.7 However, the problem is that when the 
courts analyze the legality of a warrantless smartphone search by police, 
they summarily assume that the predicate “reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy” requirement exists for there to be a “search” within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment. Courts then move directly into analyzing wheth-
er the search was appropriate under an exception to the warrant require-
ment—this most commonly being the “search incident to arrest” excep-
                                                            
 4. Cell Phone Timeline, SOFTSCHOOLS, http://www.softschools.com/timelines/cell_phone_ 
timeline/28/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Motorola released the first cell phones ten years after Dr. 
Martin Cooper invented the first handheld phone that did not need to be powered through a car. See 
id.  
 5. The growth of cell phone technology was very rapid. In 1989, Motorola introduced the first 
flip phone, and by 1993 text messaging was invented. Id. In 2002, Sanyo produced the first camera 
phones, which allowed users to connect their phones to a computer and print their pictures. Id. And 
in a move that will likely be seen as changing the course of human history, Apple released the first 
iPhone in 2007. Id. The iPhone allowed users to perform on their cell phone almost any task that 
could be performed on their home computers. Id. 
 6. See infra Parts III, IV. “Greater discussion of this topic is due to both increased cell phone 
usage and constantly evolving cell phone technology.” Ashley B. Snyder, Comment, The Fourth 
Amendment and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches: When Is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 155, 162 (2011). 
 7. See infra Parts III–V. 
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tion.8 Similarly, scholars are also guilty of making this assumption about 
privacy expectations.9 
It is the position of this Note that courts need to take a step back in 
their Fourth Amendment analysis and carefully evaluate whether indi-
viduals do in fact have the requisite privacy expectations. Specifically, 
this Note argues that with the advancement in smartphone technology 
and the ubiquity of privacy waivers in “apps,” smartphone users too of-
ten share their personal information to third parties to reasonably claim 
any general expectation of privacy to the data in their smartphones. Indi-
viduals have traded the convenience of smartphones at the expense of 
their privacy. 
In this Note, Part II examines the privacy protections of the Fourth 
Amendment and the history of the search incident to arrest exception to 
the warrant requirement. Part III surveys how various lower courts ex-
plore privacy rights in smartphones/cell phones and apply the search in-
cident to arrest exception.10 Part IV describes two fairly recent Supreme 
Court decisions that call for an examination of privacy expectations in 
smartphones and how the scholarly commentary on those decisions mis-
takenly maintains the primary focus on the search incident to arrest ex-
ception. Part V looks at the Supreme Court’s most recent 
smartphone/cell phone search case and its failure to examine privacy ex-
pectations. Part VI presents data that modern smartphones users continue 
to download apps despite the ubiquity of privacy waivers. Part VII ar-
gues that an application of the third-party doctrine may vitiate any argu-
ment that an expectation of privacy in modern smartphones exists. Part 
VIII concludes. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXCEPTION 
The Fourth Amendment states that it is “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures . . . .”11 The framers’ policy reasoning behind 
this Amendment was the desire to have magistrates, rather than law en-
forcement, determine the permissibility and limitations of searches and 
                                                            
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part IV.B. 
 10. While there is no standard definition of “smartphone” within the mobile phone industry, 
this Note uses the term in reference to mobile phones containing an operating system and capable of 
downloading apps. See Adam Fendelman, How Are Cell Phones Different From Smartphones?, 
ABOUT TECH, http://cellphones.about.com/od/coveringthebasics/qt/cellphonesvssmartphones.htm 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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seizures.12 This policy comes from the belief that magistrates, not law 
enforcement, are best able “[t]o provide the necessary security against 
unreasonable intrusions upon the private lives of individuals.”13 As such, 
“where there is a [reasonable] expectation of privacy, and no warrant is 
obtained, the search or seizure is generally illegal, and the evidence ob-
tained thereby is generally excluded, unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies.”14 However, a warrant is not required where there is 
no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—i.e., where 
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the object being 
searched.15 
Therefore, as the threshold inquiry for determining whether an in-
dividual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object being 
searched, the court asks the following two questions: (1) does the indi-
vidual subjected to the search exhibit an actual expectation of privacy, 
and (2) is that expectation one “that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.”16 This test originates from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Katz v. United States and is commonly referred to as the Katz test.17 This 
test “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.”18 In 
essence, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis requires balanc-
ing the State’s need to conduct searches and the individual’s right to pri-
vacy.19 Should the court recognize a privacy expectation, it then analyzes 
whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches 
(where a recognized privacy interest exists) are per se unreasonable,20 the 
Court recognizes many exceptions.21 One of these exceptions is the 
search incident to arrest.22 The search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement permits government agents to search a person and 
his belongings upon a valid arrest to ensure officer safety and to preserve 
                                                            
 12. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948). 
 13. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758–59 (1969) (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 
U.S. 699, 705, 708 (1948)). 
 14. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1066 (2015). 
 15. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1990) (regarding the exceptions); Illinois 
v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (regarding the expectation of privacy); see also Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 16. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 18. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
 19. See id. 
 20. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 592–93 (1982). 
 21. 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, PETER J. HENNING & SARAH N 
WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE CRIMINAL § 675 (4th ed. 2010). 
 22. Id. 
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evidence.23 This exception is the most commonly litigated issue of war-
rantless smartphone/cell phone searches. 
Courts applying the search incident to arrest exception to warrant-
less smartphone/cell phone searches do not apply the exception uniform-
ly.24 While this section details the history of the search incident to arrest 
exception and how it came to be applied to cell phone searches, it is re-
markable that courts largely overlook the threshold question—whether 
there is a reasonable expectation of cell phone privacy25—and jump al-
most directly into search incident to arrest analysis. 
The Supreme Court’s early jurisprudence on the search incident to 
arrest exception is unclear and primarily mentioned in dicta.26 However, 
the Court explicitly established this exception in Chimel v. California in 
1969.27 In Chimel, officers arrived at the house of the defendant to serve 
an arrest warrant for a coin shop burglary.28 When the officers handed 
the defendant the warrant, they asked for permission to “look around” the 
house.29 Although the defendant objected, the officers conducted a search 
of the home, even though they had no warrant to do so.30 For nearly an 
hour, the officers searched the entire house, directing the defendant’s 
wife to open various drawers and move the contents around so they could 
thoroughly see what was inside.31 The officers seized numerous items, 
including the stolen coins.32 Over the defendant’s objections that the 
items were unconstitutionally seized and admitted into evidence, the de-
fendant was convicted of the burglary.33 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
announced that 
                                                            
 23. Sara M. Corradi, Comment, Be Reasonable! Limit Warrantless Smart Phone Searches to 
Gant’s Justification for Searches Incident to Arrest, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 943, 945 (2013). 
 24. See infra Parts III, IV.B. 
 25. Put another way, whether the Fourth Amendment applies in the first place. 
 26. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (stating that there is a right of the government “under Eng-
lish and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and 
seize the fruits or evidence of crime.”)); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 755–56 (1969) 
(“When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control 
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and 
held as evidence in the prosecution.”). See also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); 
Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). 
 27. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. 
 28. Id. at 753. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 753–54. 
 31. Id. at 754. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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[w]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
[arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his es-
cape. . . . And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to 
grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by 
a like rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of 
the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate con-
trol” . . . .34 
However, applying the rule to the case, the Court held that the search of 
the defendant’s house went “far beyond” the defendant’s person and his 
immediate area; therefore, the search was not reasonable.35 
Four years after Chimel, the Court expanded the search incident to 
arrest exception in United States v. Robinson.36 In Robinson, the defend-
ant was pulled over and subsequently arrested for driving with a revoked 
license.37 The officer searched the defendant’s person and found a ciga-
rette package in the defendant’s coat pocket.38 Being able to feel that the 
package contained something other than cigarettes, the officer opened the 
package and found heroin.39 The heroin was admitted into evidence and 
used to convict the defendant of a drug offense.40 On appeal, the Su-
preme Court held that the officer was “entitled” to inspect the cigarette 
package because the search was incident to a valid arrest; therefore, the 
discovered heroin was properly seized and admitted into evidence.41 The 
Court concluded that the search was reasonable, even without a concern 
about the loss of evidence or officer safety, because “[h]aving in the 
course of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, 
[the officer] was entitled to inspect it.”42 The Court’s holding in Robin-
son establishes that the search incident to arrest exception is “limited to 
personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the ar-
restee.”43 
Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address this ex-
ception in the context of smartphones/cell phones until 2014 in Riley v. 
                                                            
 34. Id. at 762–63. 
 35. Id. at 768. 
 36. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 37. Id. at 220. 
 38. Id. at 222–23. 
 39. Id. at 223. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 236. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1, 15 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2015] Trading Privacy for Angry Birds 1497 
California,44 there was precedent set in the interim involving other 
emerging technologies such as wiretapping,45 aerial photography,46 ther-
mal detection,47 and GPS monitoring.48 The Court’s examination of a 
warrantless search of a pager in City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon is perhaps 
most analogous to a cell phone search.49 
In Quon, the City of Ontario, California employed the petitioner as 
a police officer.50 In 2001, the City issued the petitioner a pager to send 
and receive work-related text messages.51 However, before giving the 
pager to the petitioner, the City announced a “computer policy” that 
specified that the City “reserve[d] the right to monitor and log all net-
work activity including e-mail and internet use, with or without notice,” 
and the employees should not expect any privacy when using such 
items.52 While the policy did not apply to text messages on its face, the 
City did tell its employees—including the petitioner—that it would treat 
text messages as falling under the computer policy.53 Soon after receiv-
ing the pager, the petitioner went over his monthly text message limit.54 
Initially, the City told the petitioner that it did not intend on auditing his 
text messages to see if the overage was due to personal use, suggesting 
that the petitioner could pay for the overage costs rather than have to go 
through an audit process.55 As such, the petitioner continued to exceed 
the limits over the following months and reimbursed the City each 
time.56 However, the City ultimately decided to audit the petitioner’s text 
messages to evaluate whether the overages were due to personal use or 
whether the existing text message limit was too low.57 The City discov-
ered that the many of the petitioner’s messages were personal—some 
sexually explicit—and determined that the petitioner was violating the 
City’s policy.58 The City disciplined the petitioner for the violations.59 
                                                            
 44. See id. at 2480. 
 45. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530–31 (1985). 
 46. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234–39 (1986). 
 47. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46 (2001). 
 48. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952–54 (2012). 
 49. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010). 
 50. Id. at 750. 
 51. Id. at 751. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 752. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 752–53. 
 59. Id. at 753. 
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The petitioner filed a suit against the City in federal court alleging 
that the City violated his Fourth Amendment right by obtaining and re-
viewing his text messages without a warrant.60 Before the Supreme Court 
considered the specific issue presented, it noted that the Court “must pro-
ceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expecta-
tions in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a gov-
ernment employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on 
the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its 
role in society has become clear.”61 The Court further noted that “[r]apid 
changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission 
are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as 
proper behavior.”62 In its comments, the Court cannot have anticipated 
the truthfulness of the following words, written just one year into the 
iPhone era: 
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that 
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary 
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might 
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, 
the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, 
so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or simi-
lar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay for their 
own.63 
Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court assumed, arguendo, that 
the petitioner did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text 
messages, and that the search performed fell within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.64 Ultimately, the Court held that the search was rea-
sonable under the “special needs” of the workplace exception for war-
rantless searches.65 However, the Court’s assumption that there was a 
privacy expectation left the opinion’s discussion of cell phone and text 
message privacy as merely dicta. Without a firm standard set by the Su-
preme Court, lower courts were left to develop their own warrantless cell 
phone, and eventually smartphone, search jurisprudence. Unfortunately, 
many lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s example and just 
assumed that a privacy right exists in smartphones/cell phones. 
                                                            
 60. Id. at 754. 
 61. Id. at 759 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 760. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 761–62. 
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III. THE LOWER COURTS RECOGNIZE A PRIVACY INTEREST AND APPLY 
THE EXCEPTION 
Before the Supreme Court decided that the search incident to arrest 
exception does not apply to smartphones/cell phones (skipping the pre-
liminary question of whether a Fourth Amendment “search” occurred at 
all),66 the lower courts came to varying conclusions. Remarkably, the 
fast-developing technology forced courts of all levels to hear 
smartphone/cell phone cases even before the Supreme Court in Quon 
was able to comment on privacy implications.67 The leading lower court 
decision in this area is United States v. Finley.68 Contextually, Finley is 
important because it was issued the same year that Apple released the 
first iPhone.69 While the Fifth Circuit applied the correct test in determin-
ing both whether there was a privacy interest in the cell phone and 
whether there was a proper search of the cell phone incident to arrest, the 
court was in no position to anticipate how the iPhone and “app” agree-
ments would change everything. Furthermore, the Finley decision also 
unfortunately led other courts to adopt the assumption that there is a pri-
vacy right in modern cell phones without employing appropriate analysis 
in the context of the post-iPhone era. 
In Finley, the defendant was convicted of possession of metham-
phetamine with intent to distribute.70 The conviction was the result of the 
defendant’s arrest after he drove another defendant to a controlled pur-
chase conducted by local and federal law enforcement.71 After the arrest, 
officers seized and searched a cell phone that was located in the defend-
ant’s pocket.72 Although the cell phone belonged to the defendant’s em-
ployer, the defendant was also permitted to use the cell phone for per-
sonal use.73 At trial, a federal law enforcement officer testified that sev-
eral of the text messages found in the phone related to drug use and traf-
ficking.74 On appeal, the defendant asserted that the recovered text mes-
sages from the warrantless search of his phone should have been sup-
                                                            
 66. See discussion infra Part V. 
 67. United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007). Quon was arguably the Supreme 
Court’s leading cell phone privacy case until, perhaps, Gant and Jones. However, Quon was decided 
in 2010, a relatively late era in cell phone technology as the iPhone was already three years old at 
that point. The leading lower court decision, Finley, came in 2007—the same year that the iPhone 
was released. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 70. Finley, 477 F.3d at 255. 
 71. Id. at 253–54. 
 72. Id. at 254. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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pressed at the trial.75 Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately allowed the 
text messages into evidence, it did hold that there was a privacy interest 
in the cell phone. 
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit first had to decide whether the de-
fendant had standing to challenge the search of his cell phone by having 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone.76 To test for the 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court asked “(1) whether the de-
fendant is able to establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
with respect to the place being searched or items being seized, and (2) 
whether that expectation of privacy is one which society would recognize 
as reasonable.”77 Under this test, the court looks, in part, to whether there 
is a property or possessory interest in the thing being searched, whether 
there is a subjective privacy expectation that there would be no govern-
mental intrusion, and whether there were measures taken to maintain pri-
vacy.78 The court found that the defendant did have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the cell phone because, even though the defendant ex-
pected his employer to read his text messages, he maintained possession 
of the cell phone and could have reasonably expected to be free from 
intrusion by both the government and the general public.79 
Next, the court held that the search of the cell phone was a lawful 
search incident to arrest.80 The court reasoned, “It is well settled that in 
the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only 
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is 
also a reasonable search under that Amendment.”81 The court continued, 
“Police officers are not constrained to search only for weapons or in-
struments of escape on the arrestee’s person; they may also, without any 
additional justification, look for evidence of the arrestee’s crime on his 
person in order to preserve it for use at trial.”82 Noting that the scope of 
                                                            
 75. Id. at 258. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardoza-Hinojosa, 140 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir. 1998)). Note 
that this is Justice Harlan’s Katz test. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 78. Id. at 258–59 (citing United States v. Ibarra, 948 F.2d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
 79. Id. at 259. 
 80. Id. at 259–60. 
 81. Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 82. Id. at 259–60 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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the search extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person,83 the 
court held that the search was proper.84 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the officers needed 
a warrant to search the phone because it was tantamount to a closed con-
tainer by reaffirming that containers, even closed containers, may be 
searched pursuant to a valid custodial arrest.85 Also important to the 
court’s holding was its finding that a cell phone “does not fit into the cat-
egory of ‘property not immediately associated with [the defendant’s] 
person’ because it was on his person at the time of his arrest.”86 As a 
gloss to the search incident to arrest rule, this distinction is important 
because “[o]nce law enforcement officers have reduced . . . personal 
property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to 
their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee 
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, 
a search of that property is no longer an incident to arrest”; therefore, the 
search of the property would then require a warrant.87 By holding that a 
cell phone is immediately associated with the defendant’s person, the 
court found that the search of the cell phone incident to arrest was prop-
er.88 
However, not all courts have followed Finley’s reasoning. For ex-
ample, in the Northern District of California case of United States v. 
Park, San Francisco police narcotics officers had a warrant to search a 
home.89 After executing the warrant, the officers arrested the defendants 
and transported them to the police station for booking.90 After the de-
fendants were booked and their cell phones were placed into evidence, 
the police searched the contents of their cell phones at the police sta-
                                                            
 83. Id. at 260 (citing United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) (holding that containers within the arrestee’s 
reach may be searched); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 223–24 (1973) (upholding the 
search of a cigarette package found on the arrestee’s person)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 260 n.7 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)). 
 87. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. 
 88. Finley, 477 F.3d at 260. Many courts have adopted the Finley approach. Shortly after the 
Finley decision, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits adopted its reasoning, and upheld as constitutional 
the search of cell phones incident to arrest on the theory of preserving evidence. See United States v. 
Young, 278 F. App’x 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). See also United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 
F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding the search of a cell phone as a valid search incident to arrest 
where the sole purpose of the search was to find the phone’s number); United States v. Murphy, 552 
F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that storage capacity does not affect whether a search is constitu-
tional). 
 89. United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 90. Id. at *2. 
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tion.91 Rejecting the reasoning in Finley, the court held that the search 
was not proper as a search incident to arrest because “cellular phones 
should be considered ‘possessions within an arrestee’s immediate con-
trol’ and not part of ‘the person.’”92 While the court noted that Finley 
was distinguishable because there the search was conducted at the loca-
tion of the arrest, and here the search was conducted after booking, thus 
not meeting the “contemporaneous” requirement of Chadwick, the Park 
court relied more on the large storage capabilities of modern cell 
phones93 and a policy argument that they should never be considered part 
of “the person,” only “possessions within an arrestee’s immediate con-
trol.”94 The court argued that a contrary holding would have “far-ranging 
consequences” because modern cell phones—which the court argued 
were more in line with personal computers—contain vast amounts of 
personal information and a search of such phones would go beyond the 
original “evidence protection” rationale for searches incident to arrest.95 
Tellingly, the Park court never overtly considered whether the de-
fendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone in the 
first place. The court seemed to have assumed that there was such an ex-
pectation because of the amount of information contained in the cell 
phone, and it proceeded directly to determining whether an exception to 
the search warrant requirement applied.96 The court did not consider 
whether the defendants exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the cell phone or whether that expectation was one that society was pre-
pared to accept as reasonable. The court did not even mention how the 
defendants used and treated the data stored in their cell phones. In fact, 
the mistake of assuming that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in cell phones, and now smartphones, without giving the issue its due 
analysis, is a common one. 
                                                            
 91. Id. at *3. 
 92. Id. at *8 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 16 n.10). 
 93. Id. (“This is so because modern cellular phones have the capacity for storing immense 
amounts of private information. Unlike pagers or address books, modern cell phones record incom-
ing and outgoing calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and text messages, 
email, video and pictures. Individuals can store highly personal information on their cell phones, and 
can record their most private thoughts and conversations on their cell phones through email and text, 
voice and instant messages.”). Id. Note that this case refers to cell phones, but its reasoning and 
description of cell phone capabilities could easily be attributed to smartphones. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. Presumably, even if the court did analyze whether there was a privacy interest in the 
cell phone, the analysis would be outdated. Like Finley, this opinion was issued in 2007, the same 
year the iPhone was released. Thus, Park would have similarly not been able to anticipate the chang-
es the iPhone heralded. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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For example, in State v. Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court had to de-
termine whether the search of a cell phone found on the person of an ar-
restee accused of being a drug dealer was constitutional as a search inci-
dent to arrest.97 After first acknowledging that Finley and Park provide 
the leading framework for this issue, the court recognized that “[g]iven 
the continuing rapid advancements in cell phone technology . . . there are 
legitimate concerns regarding the effect of allowing warrantless searches 
of cell phones, especially so-called smart phones, which allow for 
high-speed Internet access and are capable of storing tremendous 
amounts of private data.”98 Initially, the court rejected a distinction be-
tween the defendant’s “standard” phone and “smart phones.”99 The de-
fendant in this case did not have what is considered a conventional 
“smart phone.”100 However, the court noted that modern “standard” cell 
phones, not just smartphones, are capable of performing much more 
complex tasks than traditional phones, for example, sending text messag-
es, storing information, and taking pictures.101 On this reasoning, the 
court declined to distinguish between modern “traditional” cell phones 
and “smart phones.”102 From there, the court determined that a cell 
phone’s ability to store large amounts of data is what gives the phone’s 
owner “a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of pri-
vacy in the information they contain.”103 Like the Finley court, the court 
here failed to consider how the defendant used and treated the infor-
mation in his cell phone as a consideration for determining whether a 
reasonable expectation of privacy existed. 
                                                            
 97. State v. Smith, 920 N.E. 2d 949, 950–51 (Ohio 2009). 
 98. Id. at 954. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 956. 
 101. Id. at 954. 
 102. Id. The court determined not to draw a legal distinction between smartphones and modern 
“standard” cell phones because of their overlapping capabilities. Id. (“[W]e note that in today’s 
advanced technological age many ‘standard’ cell phones include a variety of features above and 
beyond the ability to place phone calls. Indeed, . . . many cell phones give users the ability to send 
text messages and take pictures. Other modern ‘standard’ cell phones can also store and transfer data 
and allow users to connect to the Internet. Because basic cell phones in today’s world have a wide 
variety of possible functions, it would not be helpful to create a rule that requires officers to discern 
the capabilities of a cell phone before acting accordingly.”). Id. 
 103. Id. at 955. Other courts have also relied on the storage capacity of cell phones for finding 
a reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Zavala, 514 F.3d 562, 577 (5th Cir. 
2008); Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Or. 2012) (holding that an expecta-
tion of privacy exists because modern cell phones hold large amounts of private information, includ-
ing “phonebook information, appointment calendars, text messages, call logs, photographs, audio 
and video recordings, web browsing history, electronic documents and user location information.”). 
But see People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 508–09 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting the storage capacity reasoning 
as too subjective to particular items). 
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As illustrated above, the real problem lies in how the courts are de-
termining that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
smartphones/cell phones. Courts are either not giving the issue sufficient 
analysis—Smith, for example—or are merely assuming that a privacy 
interest exists—Park, for example.104 Even where courts do test whether 
the Fourth Amendment applies, the tests are based on outmoded cell 
phone paradigms.105 Indeed, a thorough and honest inquiry into the 
Fourth Amendment’s applicability to smartphone searches may not occur 
if courts refuse to analyze the possible legal significance of the differ-
ence between smartphones and cell phones.106 However, after the lower 
courts split on their analyses,107 some scholars believed that a pair of 
United States Supreme Court decisions offered guidance towards a uni-
form national method of analyzing the warrantless search of 
smartphones/cell phones.108 
IV. GANT, JONES, AND THE FUTURE OF CELL PHONE SEARCHES? 
A. The Gant and Jones Decisions 
Some commenters believe that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Ar-
izona v. Gant109 and United States v. Jones110 foreshadowed the Court’s 
future warrantless smartphone/cell phone search jurisprudence.111 How-
ever, even these cases assume that the Fourth Amendment protects these 
searches and they continue to focus on the search incident to arrest ex-
ception. 
The Gant decision greatly limited the areas in which police may 
search under the search incident to arrest doctrine. Later, courts used 
Gant as a basis for limiting searches of cellphones.112 In Gant, after the 
defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, police offic-
                                                            
 104. See Smith, 920 N.E. 2d at 950–51. See also Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell 
Phone Search Not: Applying the Search-Incident-To-Arrest Exception to the Cell Phone as “Hy-
brid”, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 460 (2012) (“Most courts that have held a warrantless cell phone 
search was reasonable did not extensively discuss the expectation of privacy.”). See, e.g., United 
States v. Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 105. See, e.g., Smith, 920 N.E. 2d at 954. 
 106. See, e.g., id. 
 107. Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir. 2007) with United States v. 
Park, No. CR 05-375SI, 2007 WL 1521573 *1, *8 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007). 
 108. See infra Part IV.B. 
 109. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
 110. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 111. See discussion infra Part IV.B.   
 112. Id.  
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ers proceeded to search his car.113 The officers discovered cocaine in the 
pocket of a jacket that was located on the back seat.114 At trial, the de-
fendant moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that the warrant-
less search violated the Fourth Amendment because he was already 
handcuffed in the back of the patrol car and posed no threat to the offic-
ers.115 Recognizing that the officers had no probable cause for the search, 
the trial court, nonetheless, denied the motion to suppress and held that 
the search was permissible as a search incident to arrest.116 The Supreme 
Court eventually heard the propriety of the admission of the cocaine into 
evidence. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, be-
gan its analysis by reaffirming the base rule that searches incident to ar-
rest are applicable only to areas within the arrestee’s immediate control, 
“meaning ‘the area from within which he might gain possession of a 
weapon or destructible evidence.’”117 Ultimately, the Court held the 
search was improper under the search incident to arrest exception, and 
the evidence should have been suppressed at trial. The Court reasoned, 
“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if 
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest.”118 Specifically, this holding applies 
law enforcement’s ability to search all containers located within the ve-
hicle for evidence.119  
In Jones, the FBI suspected the defendant of conspiracy in traffick-
ing narcotics in the District of Columbia.120 As part of its investigation, 
the FBI received a warrant to use an electronic tracking device on a car 
belonging to the defendant’s wife.121 Although the warrant authorized the 
FBI to use and install the GPS device within ten days in the District of 
Columbia, the FBI agents installed the device on the eleventh day and 
outside the District of Columbia.122 Before trial, the defendant moved to 
suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS device.123 While the dis-
trict court suppressed the data that was obtained while the vehicle was 
                                                            
 113. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 336–37. 
 116. Id. at 337. 
 117. Id. at 335 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
 118. Id. at 351. 
 119. See id.at 345–51.  
 120. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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parked at the defendant’s residence, it admitted into evidence data that 
was gathered while the car was traveling.124 The district court reasoned 
that “a person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another.”125 However, the trial in which this evidence was admitted re-
sulted in a hung jury.126 Subsequently, a grand jury returned another con-
spiracy indictment against the defendant, and, this time, the defendant 
was found guilty.127 The appellate court reversed the conviction on the 
grounds that the evidence obtained by the warrantless use of the GPS 
device violated the Fourth Amendment.128 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the ma-
jority,129 said that the Court’s earlier Fourth Amendment cases attach the 
Fourth Amendment right to persons, not places, and applied the “reason-
able expectation of privacy” test130 to evaluate alleged violations.131 Jus-
tice Scalia emphasized that when applying the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, the Court, at the very least, “must ‘assure preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.’”132 Citing various cases and reasoning that 
Katz “did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope,” Justice Scalia 
said that the Court has “embodied that preservation of past rights in our 
very definition of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which we have 
said to be an expectation ‘that has a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property 
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by socie-
ty.’”133 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the attachment of the 
GPS device constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory 
                                                            
 124. Id. 
 125. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983)). 
 126. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 127. Id. at 948–49. 
 128. Id. at 949 (citing United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 129. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and 
Justice Sotomayor. 
 130. Note, again, this is Justice Harlan’s Katz test. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
 131. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
374, 351 (1967)) (additional citations omitted). 
 132. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
 133. Id. at 951 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)) (emphasis added). 
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test.”134 Thus, the search was unconstitutional for going beyond the pa-
rameters set by the warrant because the officers physically attached the 
GPS device to the vehicle.135 
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion, stated that “it may be 
necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third par-
ties.”136 Justice Sotomayor believed that the “third-party” approach137 
was “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks.”138 Noting that people routinely disclose everything 
from phone numbers dialed, to books read, to medications purchased, 
Justice Sotomayor did not “assume that all information voluntarily dis-
closed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that 
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”139 Justice 
Sotomayor cautioned that under the Supreme Court’s current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, despite societal expectations to privacy, peo-
ple will only have those interests protected if the Court “ceases to treat 
secrecy as a perquisite for privacy.”140 
Justice Alito, in his concurring opinion,141 criticized the majority 
for not explaining how the attachment of the GPS device fits within the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”142 After noting the problems with the majority’s “trespass” 
approach and advocating for an expectation of privacy test, Justice Alito 
                                                            
 134. Id. at 952 (emphasis added). The majority clarified this comment in the following foot-
note: “Thus, our theory is not that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with any technical trespass 
that led to the gathering of evidence. The Fourth Amendment protects against trespassory searches 
only with regard to those items (persons, houses, papers, and effects) that it enumerates.” Id. at 953 
n.8 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Having a trespassory test in addition to the Katz 
test presents an interesting question, which is outside the scope of this Note: If the data contained in 
the smartphone is not protected under the Fourth Amendment, does the Fourth Amendment at least 
protect individuals from police physically handling the smartphone to gain access to the information 
contained therein? 
 135. See id. at 952–54. 
 136. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 137. Presumably referencing the third-party doctrine. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 139. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Privacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. 
Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need 
not assume that this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”)) (citing Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in 
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”)). 
 140. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 141. His concurrence is joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan. 
 142. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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recognized that test comes with its own problems.143 First, “judges are 
apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypo-
thetical reasonable person to which the [expectation of privacy] test 
looks.”144 Second, the test assumes that citizens have a “well-developed 
and stable set of privacy expectations.”145 However, Justice Alito assert-
ed that technology can drastically change popular expectations to priva-
cy.146 While he acknowledged that legislatures have the ability to pass 
legislation to protect privacy interests,147 Justice Alito pointed out that 
statutes regulating the use of GPS technology for law enforcement pur-
poses have not become law, and the best the Court could do in the instant 
case was to evaluate the “degree of intrusion that a reasonable person 
would not have anticipated.”148 While Justice Alito asserted that the pub-
lic views the short-term—but not long-term—monitoring of movement 
on public streets as reasonable, he also recognized that evolving technol-
ogy continues to entice the average citizen to trade privacy for conven-
ience.149 
While the opinions of Gant and Jones seem to call into question 
expectations to privacy in the current technological era—specifically 
how societal devaluation of privacy in technology may be eroding the 
basis for any Fourth Amendment protections—most subsequent scholar-
ly discussion still focuses on how the Supreme Court would likely rule 
on the search of a smartphone/cell phone under the search incident to 
arrest exception. Scholars, and for that matter courts, are missing the op-
portunity to reevaluate whether individuals have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their smartphones. 
B. Judicial and Scholarly Analysis of Privacy Expectations Is (Still) 
Lacking 
Post Gant and Jones, lower courts, if anything, seemed frustrated 
by the Supreme Court’s continued allowance of smartphone/cell phone 
searches incident to arrest, and its failure to announce a bright-line rule 
                                                            
 143. Id. at 960–62. 
 144. Id. at 962 (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 963 (noting congressional passage of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 to protect against 
unwanted intrusions from wiretapping). 
 148. Id. at 964. 
 149. Id. at 963–64 (noting that GPS monitoring in cell phones provides users services ranging 
from real-time traffic conditions to more social uses, such as finding or avoiding other GPS users). 
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that all such searches may only be conducted pursuant to a warrant.150 
For example, in United States v. Gomez, the court stated: 
Even though we may disagree with the application of [the] 
post-Chimel line of cases to the ever-advancing technology of cell 
phones, or more specifically to the application of the . . . [container] 
rule for searches incident to arrest (as limited by Gant), we are con-
strained to apply the law as the Supreme Court currently pronounc-
es it.151 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Hill recognized that cell phones 
are capable of storing large amounts of personal information, but it was 
“unwilling to conclude” that cell phone searches are not subject to the 
search incident to arrest exception without “guidance from the Supreme 
Court or the Ninth Circuit . . . .”152 Interestingly, the Hill court seemed 
persuaded by the Park decision but was unwilling to act without binding 
precedent.153 Gomez and Hill highlight that courts are cognizant of the 
advancements in cell phone technology but are unwilling to affirmatively 
examine the consequences of those advancements; instead, they continue 
to proceed into search incident to arrest analysis. 
After Gant and Jones, even scholars seemed not to heed the Jones 
concurrences’ calls to reexamine the privacy interests in smartphones. In 
fact, scholars continue to simply focus on the search incident to arrest 
exception and its application to smartphones/cell phones. For example, 
according to Sara Corradi, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Gant can be 
directly applied to a person’s privacy interest in his or her smartphone.154 
Corradi believes that the reasoning in Gant—that searches incident to 
arrest should be limited to areas that pose an actual risk of officer safety 
or evidence destruction—applies to “any situation in which officers at-
tempt to conduct a broad search of a suspect’s person and effects, despite 
his expectation of privacy, simply because the suspect has been arrest-
ed.”155 Specifically, because all the lower courts have found that individ-
uals have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their cell phones, Gant’s 
reasoning should apply to smartphones.156 Therefore, the Court should 
find that a smartphone search is “a gross invasion of privacy, and thus 
                                                            
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (S.D. Fla. 2011); United 
States v. Hill, No. Cr 10-00261 JSW, 2011 WL 90130, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 151. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
 152. Hill, 2011 WL 90130, at *7. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Corradi, supra note 23, at 953.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 953–55. 
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unconstitutional”157 unless there is a reasonable expectation that evidence 
incident to the arrest would be found on phone.158 Essentially, Corradi 
argues that smartphones and computers are becoming more and more 
similar; therefore, courts should apply the recognized privacy interest in 
computers to smartphones.159 While she notes many technological simi-
larities,160 Corradi does not consider the most important dissimilarity—
smartphones and apps downloaded onto smartphones share much of the 
user’s “private” information. At most, Corradi relies on Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring comments in Jones—that Justice Sotomayor 
“would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some 
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, dis-
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”161 Corradi, in turn, assumes 
that “[u]nder this theory, individuals should not have less of an expecta-
tion of privacy in their smart phones simply due to the amount of infor-
mation that is shared with the cell phone company or other third par-
ties.”162 Similar to the courts, Corradi does not give full consideration to 
how modern smartphones are used. 
Even in an article titled “The Whole World Contained: How The 
Ubiquitous Use Of Mobile Phones Undermines Your Right To Be Free 
From Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,” Mina Ford fails to fully ex-
amine whether individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when using smartphones.163 Ford argues that law enforcement should 
never be able to search a smartphone without a search warrant, or, put 
another way, that there should be no warrantless search exception for 
smartphones at all (this includes the search incident to arrest excep-
tion).164 Ford declares that “[i]t is almost a laughable notion” to believe 
that society would not recognize a privacy expectation in cell phones as 
reasonable.165 Ford assumes that “mobile phone users have exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of their mobile phones,” 
                                                            
 157. Id. at 954. 
 158. Id. at 961–63. 
 159. Id. at 958–59. 
 160. According to Corradi, the similarities include: the ability to make voice calls over the 
Internet; the ability to download programs, including messaging programs; and the ability to access 
stored information on other devices and on cloud drives. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 161. Id. at 955–56 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring)). 
 162. Id. at 956. 
 163. Mina Ford, Note, The Whole World Contained: How the Ubiquitous Use of Mobile 
Phones Undermines Your Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1077 (2012). 
 164. Id. at 1103. 
 165. Id. 
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and only offers as evidence for such a claim two online articles that criti-
cize a cellular phone company’s collection of text messages.166 But Ford 
does not critically examine how smartphone users interact with their 
phones and the data contained therein on a daily basis. 
Similar to the problem in the courts, scholarly works seem, at most, 
to recognize that there may be a question of whether a privacy interest in 
smartphones exists,167 but instead proceed to devote their time to the 
search incident to arrest exception.168 If the courts and scholars took the 
time to actually consider the current smartphone and data-sharing para-
digm, they may discover that finding a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is not such an easy task. 
V. THE SUPREME COURT MISSED ITS SECOND CHANCE 
Indeed, the Supreme Court had a chance to definitively address the 
issue of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in 
smartphones in Riley v. California;169 but, again, the Court assumed such 
an expectation existed and moved straight into a search incident to arrest 
analysis.170 Riley is actually a consolidated opinion of two different cases 
addressing the same issue: “[H]ow the search incident to arrest doctrine 
applies to modern cell phones . . . .”171 In the first case, police officers 
                                                            
 166. Id. at 1103 n.175 (citing Indu Chandrasekhar et al., Phone Hacking: Timeline of the Scan-
dal, TELEGRAPH  (July 23, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/phone-hacking/8634176 
/Phone-hacking-timeline-of-a-scandal.html) (citing Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Carrier IQ ‘May 
Have’ Collected Text Messages, ZDNET (Dec. 14, 2011, 7:58 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/ 
hardware/carrier-iq-may-have-collected-text-messages/17122). 
 167. For an interesting example of an argument that as smartphones/cell phones become capa-
ble of storing even more information, the privacy interest in those phones necessarily increases, see 
Daniel Zamani, Note, There’s an Amendment For That: A Comprehensive Application of Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence to Smart Phones, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 169, 198 (2010) (“The full 
potential of smart phones has yet to be seen, but it seems certain that their popularity will only con-
tinue to grow. As they reach ubiquity, both in society and in people’s lives, the expectation of priva-
cy in them will increase.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data Extraction 
Devices, Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the Warrantless Cell Phone Search Prob-
lem, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 602–03 (2013); Margaret M. Lawton, Warrantless Searches 
and Smart Phones: Privacy in the Palm of Your Hand?, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 89, 102–03 (2012); 
Park, supra note 104, at 462; Samuel J. H. Beutler, Note, The New World of Mobile Communication: 
Redefining the Scope of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 375, 386–90 (2013); Ashley B. Snyder, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Warrant-
less Cell Phone Searches: When is Your Cell Phone Protected?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 155, 
161–62 (2011). 
 169. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 170. Id. at 2482–85. 
 171. Id. at 2484. Even the Court’s framing of its issue statement is a testament to the lack of 
consideration given to whether a Fourth Amendment “search” took place at all as determined 
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stopped the defendant for driving with expired tags.172 Upon contact with 
the defendant, the police officers discovered that he had a suspended li-
cense and arrested him.173 During the search incident to the arrest, the 
officers found “items associated with the ‘Bloods’ street gang.”174 This 
search also included one of the officers seizing a smartphone175 from the 
defendant’s pants pocket.176 “The officer accessed information on the 
phone and noticed that some words (presumably in text messages or a 
contacts list) were preceded by the letters ‘CK’—a label that, he be-
lieved, stood for ‘Crip Killers,’ a slang term for members of the Bloods 
gang.”177 Two hours later, a detective “specializing in gangs” also went 
through the phone, “looking for evidence, because . . . gang members 
will often video themselves with guns or take pictures of themselves with 
the guns.”178 The detective found a video where the word “Blood” was 
used as well as pictures of the defendant standing in front of a car that 
the officers believed to be involved in an earlier shooting.179 
The defendant was ultimately charged with multiple crimes related 
to the earlier shooting, an aggravating factor being that the crimes were 
gang-related.180 The defendant unsuccessfully moved pre-trial to sup-
press the evidence obtained from the smartphone on the grounds that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers did not ob-
tain a warrant, and none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement 
applied.181 The trial court admitted the smartphone evidence, and the de-
fendant was convicted on all counts.182 A California appellate court af-
firmed both the conviction and the evidence admission, holding that the 
“Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search of cell phone data in-
cident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately associated 
with the arrestee’s person.”183 
                                                                                                                                     
through the reasonable expectations test. Id. The Court couches the issue only in the search incident 
to arrest exception. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2480. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. The Court defined “smart phone” as “cell phone with a broad range of other functions 
based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.” Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 2480–81. 
 179. Id. at 2481. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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In the second case, the defendant was arrested after police officers 
observed him selling drugs from a car.184 At the police station, an officer 
seized a “flip phone”185 from the defendant and noticed that the phone 
was receiving calls from a source labeled “my house.”186 The officer 
opened the phone, looked up the phone number associated with “my 
house,” and traced that number to an apartment building.187 The officers 
also saw that the phone’s wallpaper was a picture of a woman and a ba-
by.188 The officers then went to the apartment building, saw a mailbox 
with the defendant’s name on it, and observed someone who resembled 
the woman from the wallpaper through a window.189 Based on this in-
formation, the officers obtained a search warrant for the apartment, 
where they subsequently found drugs and a gun.190 
The defendant was charged with multiple drug and firearm 
crimes.191 Although the defendant moved to suppress the evidence ob-
tained from the search of the apartment, arguing that “it was the fruit of 
an unconstitutional search of his cell phone,” the trial court denied the 
motion.192 As such, the defendant was convicted of all charges.193 How-
ever, the First Circuit reversed the denial of the motion to suppress and 
vacated the convictions.194 The First Circuit held that a search warrant for 
the flip phone was indeed required because “cell phones are distinct from 
other physical possessions that may be searched incident to arrest with-
out a warrant, because of the amount of personal data cell phones contain 
and the negligible threat they pose to law enforcement interests.”195 
On the facts of these cases, pundits expected the Supreme Court to 
not just answer whether police officers generally may search a 
smartphone/cell phone under the search incident to arrest exception, but 
also to address the implications of modern technology—specifically 
whether there is a different standard for “flip phones” versus “smart 
                                                            
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. The Court defined a “flip phone” as “a kind of phone that is flipped open for use and 
that generally has a smaller range of features than a smart phone.” Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 2482. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (citing United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013)). 
 195. Id. (citing Wurie, 728 F.3d at 8–11). 
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phones.”196 However, like the Court’s opinions and scholarly articles that 
came before it, Riley missed the chance to address whether there truly 
was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and only focused on the 
search incident to arrest exception.197 After the Court quoted the Fourth 
Amendment, it moved directly into analyzing the issue under the search 
incident to arrest exception.198 In doing so, the Court stated: 
As the text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is “reasonableness.” Our cases have determined that 
where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to dis-
cover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness general-
ly requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant. Such a warrant en-
sures that the inferences to support a search are drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer en-
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. In 
the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within 
a specific exception to the warrant requirement.199 
As such, while the Court recognized that “modern cell phones, which are 
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of hu-
man anatomy,”200 the Court spent the vast remainder of the opinion sole-
ly focused on the search incident to arrest exception. 
While acknowledging that the Government “suggested” that “offic-
ers should always be able to search a phone’s call log,201 as they did in” 
the flip phone case at bar, the Court punted analyzing the issue by point-
ing out that “[t]here is no dispute here that the officers engaged in a 
search” of the flip phone.202 In that one sentence, the Supreme Court 
avoided analyzing the preliminary Fourth Amendment question of 
whether there was a “search” by discussing (1) does the individual sub-
jected to the search exhibit an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) is 
                                                            
 196. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Decide Case on Police Cellphone Searches, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-to-decide-
case-on-police-cellphone-searches/2014/01/17/b0f3c61e-7f8a-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html.  
 197. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473. 
 198. Id. at 2482. 
 199. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 200. Id. at 2484. 
 201. Id. at 2492. To support its “suggestion,” the Government cited Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979). Id. See also discussion infra Part VII. 
 202. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93. Indeed, by arguing that the officers should be able to look at 
the phone’s call log, the Government was, in fact, arguing that no “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment occurred. Id. 
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that expectation “one that society is prepared to recognize as reasona-
ble.”203 
Ultimately, the Court held that police must always get a search war-
rant before searching a smartphone/cell phone because once law en-
forcement seizes the phone, there is neither an officer safety concern nor 
a reason to believe that evidence within the phone would be destroyed 
before a search warrant could be obtained.204 As will be discussed in the 
following two Parts of this Note, the way individuals use the data in their 
smartphones and consideration of the third-party doctrine should have 
justified the Riley Court in discussing whether a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment occurred at all.205 
VI. SHARING TOO MUCH INFORMATION  
As one scholar so aptly stated, 
Many of us are ambivalent about the value of privacy. On the one 
hand, for example, a lack of privacy is typically the stuff of dystopi-
as. But on the other hand, some limitations on privacy, whatever the 
justification, give rise among many persons to only modest concern, 
if not to utter indifference.206  
Most smartphone users fall more on the “utter indifference” side of this 
privacy–concern spectrum. Under the current technological paradigm, 
smartphone users routinely disclose the phone numbers they call, the 
websites they visit, and the recipients of emails sent.207 Moreover, 
smartphone users also share many other aspects of their lives with others, 
ranging from their locations208 to even their moods.209 
                                                            
 203. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. Interestingly, towards the end of the Riley 
opinion, the Court did come close to discussing third-party doctrine as it applies to information 
contained in smartphones/cell phones. However, the Court did not actually refer to the “third-party 
doctrine.” For the definition of the third-party doctrine and discussion on its applicability to 
smartphones, see discussion infra Part VII. 
 204. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–88, 2495. 
 205. See discussion infra Parts VI, VII. 
 206. R. George Wright, Some Reasons for Our Ambivalence About the Value of Privacy, 22 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 45, 45–46 (2013). 
 207. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 208. Shane Dingman, Here I Am! More Smartphone Users Share Geo-location Data: Survey, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 12, 2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/ 
digital-culture/here-i-am-more-smartphone-users-share-geo-location-data-survey/article14276866/. 
This article describes the results of a Pew survey, finding that that 30% of persons over the age of 18 
enable the geo-location features of their social media accounts to track their location through their 
cell phones. Moreover, this article asserts individuals find allowing passive geo-location tracking 
more desirable than pressing a button in an app to announce their location. See id. On the other hand, 
only about 35% of smartphone users have at one point “explicitly turned off” the geo-location fea-
tures of their phones. Id. 
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As of February 13, 2014, there were 1,132,053 apps in the Android 
market.210 Likewise, as of January 2014, Apple’s App Store contained 
1,100,827 apps.211 While Apple and Google do not often report on cumu-
lative or daily downloads, as of early 2013, both companies reported ap-
proximately 50 billion total app downloads worldwide.212 Moreover, the 
frequency of app downloads seems to be increasing exponentially; in a 
three-month period in 2013, Apple reported 5 billion app downloads, and 
in a single month in 2013, Android reported 2.5 billion app downloads.213 
On average, an individual smartphone user has installed twenty-six 
apps.214 While the sheer number of downloads is impressive, what is re-
ally impressive is what the numbers say about society’s apathy towards 
privacy. 
Lately, various governments and companies have shown concern 
over apps that do not disclose their data collection policies. For example, 
in January 2013, California’s Attorney General released a twenty-three-
page report on mobile privacy with the intent to improve privacy protec-
tions.215 In California, apps that collect personal information are required 
to display their privacy policies or face a $2,500 fine per app down-
load.216 To bring developers in line with California’s law, Amazon, 
Google, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, and Research in Motion “agreed to 
                                                                                                                                     
 209. How Are You Feeling? Microsoft’s Mood-Sensing Smartphone Can Tell, GMA NEWS 
ONLINE, (July 2, 2013, 5:25 PM), http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/315610/scitech/ 
technology/how-are-you-feeling-microsoft-s-mood-sensing-smartphone-can-tell. This online article 
describes Microsoft’s efforts to develop a program that senses a cell phone user’s mood based on 
how he or she uses the phone. See generally id. In turn, a user’s mood could be automatically shared 
to social networks, allowing others to better know how and when to communicate with the cell 
phone user. See id.  
 210. Number of Android Applications, APPBRAIN, http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-
android-apps (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 211. App Store Metrics, POCKETGAMER.BIZ, http://148apps.biz/app-store-metrics/?mpage= 
appcount (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). 
 212. Benedict Evans, How Many Apps Do Android and iOS Users Download?, BENEDICT 
EVANS (May 16, 2013), http://ben-evans.com/benedictevans/2013/5/16/how-many-apps-do-android-
and-ios-users-download. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Tony Bradley, Study Finds Most Mobile Apps Put Your Security and Privacy at Risk, PC 
WORLD (Dec. 5, 2013, 09:54 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2068824/study-finds-most-
mobile-apps-put-your-security-and-privacy-at-risk.html. 
 215. KAMALA D. HARRIS, ATT’Y GEN., CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ON THE GO: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM (2013), available at https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/ 
files/pdfs/privacy/privacy_on_the_go.pdf. 
 216. Joe Mullin, CA to App Devs: Get Privacy Policies or Risk $2500-per-download Fines, 
ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2012, 06:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/12/ca-to-app-
devs-get-privacy-policies-or-risk-2500-per-download-fines/. 
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a set of privacy principles, which include[d] allowing consumers to re-
view the privacy policy for any app before they download it.”217 
The federal government has also taken notice of the lack of privacy 
policy disclosures in apps. In a study focusing on apps designed for chil-
dren, the Federal Trade Commission determined that “[t]he mobile app 
marketplace is growing at a tremendous speed, and many consumer pro-
tections, including privacy and privacy disclosures, have not kept pace 
with this development.”218 The study, looking at a random sample of 
“kid” apps,219 found that only 20% of the apps surveyed disclosed any 
information about the app’s privacy practices.220 However, “60[%] of the 
surveyed apps collect geolocation, phone number, contacts, call logs, 
unique identifiers, and other information stored on the device; and send 
the information to the app developers or to advertising networks, analyt-
ics companies, and other third parties.”221 
Combining the research above, of the twenty-six apps on an aver-
age user’s smartphone, fifteen collect some sort of personal information; 
of those fifteen apps, the user has only seen approximately five privacy 
agreements.222 However, presumably due to California’s privacy law and 
the agreement between the major tech companies, all individuals, not just 
Californians, are now exposed to privacy policies. Of course, this is not 
to say that the privacy policies actually protect individuals’ private in-
formation contained within their smartphones. 
   
                                                            
 217. Mathew J. Schwartz, California Targets Mobile Apps for Missing Privacy Policies, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/ 
California-targets-mobile-apps-for-missing-privacy-policies/d/d-id/1107139?. 
 218. FED. TRADE COMM’N, MOBILE APPS FOR KIDS: CURRENT PRIVACY DISCLOSURES ARE 
DISAPPOINTING 3 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ 
mobile-apps-kids-current-privacy-disclosures-are-disappointing/120216mobile_apps_kids.pdf. 
 219. Id. at A2. 
 220. FTC Report Faults Mobile App Makers on Privacy, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN + 
SELZ, PC (Jan. 7, 2013), http://fkks.com/news/ftc-report-faults-mobile-app-makers-on-privacy. 
 221. Id. 
 222. These calculations are for demonstration purposes only. As far as my research has discov-
ered, no one has conducted a study that examines the general population of apps (not just children’s 
apps) and surveyed how often individuals read privacy policies and make the choice of whether or 
not to download the app based on the privacy policy. 
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A good example of a privacy policy shown to users before down-
loading an app is the privacy policy provided for Angry Birds. Within 
Google Play and on an Android smartphone, one must accept the follow-
ing information before being allowed to download Angry Birds: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Should a user be determined to look up the privacy policy pub-
lished on the Rovio Entertainment website,223 the user would discover 
that while Rovio says that it maintains the right to disclose collected 
“non-personal” data from the user’s smartphone, Rovio also states it 
“may employ third party ad serving technologies . . . .”224 In order to pre-
sent personalized advertisements to the user, these third parties “may 
collect and use data . . . including but not limited to, data such as IP ad-
dress, Device ID, MAC address, installed software, application usage 
data, hardware type, Operating System information, browser infor-
mation, unique identifiers in browser cookies, Flash cookies, and 
HTML5 local storage, Internet and on-line usage information . . . .”225 
Moreover, Rovio does not warrant that these third parties will not use an 
individual’s personal data—that use is subject to the third parties’ own 
terms of service, which the user agrees to by downloading Angry Birds, 
but is not described in Rovio’s Privacy Policy.226 Indeed, while Rovio 
provides a link to opt out of some of the “behaviorally targeted advertis-
                                                            
 223. Who We Are, ROVIO, http://www.rovio.com/en/about-us/Company (last visited Mar. 17, 
2015). Rovio Entertainment is the creator and publisher of Angry Birds. 
 224. Privacy Policy, ROVIO, http://www.rovio.com/privacy (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. 
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ing,” the user must still “note that the links above may not reach all [of] 
Rovio’s advertising partners and certain behaviorally targeted advertising 
may still be displayed to you. If you want to be certain that no behavior-
ally targeted advertisements are displayed to you, please do not use or 
access the Services.”227 Cynically, these terms may be read as a dis-
claimer that should an individual download Angry Birds, it is highly like-
ly their personal information will be shared. 
Nonetheless, no matter the accuracy of the above calculations, and 
even if one assumes that smartphone users are exposed to privacy poli-
cies for all of their downloaded apps, one principle is clear: people are 
not deterred by the frequent and wide-ranging collection of their personal 
data. At a minimum, the formal practice of allowing a developer to gath-
er personal data in exchange for being able to download an app is a 
widespread practice. 
What is to be made, then, of Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s com-
ments on privacy interests in the new technological era from Jones? If 
the test is whether the individual being searched exhibits a subjective 
expectation of privacy and whether society recognizes that expectation as 
reasonable, the numbers above seriously call into question whether there 
is an expectation of privacy in smartphones. 
VII. TRADITIONAL PHONE PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE AS THE DOWNFALL 
OF PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS? 
To answer Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s calls to reexamine priva-
cy expectations, it seems logical to apply the third-party doctrine from 
the Court’s reasoning in Smith v. Maryland.228 In Smith, a telephone 
company, at law enforcement’s request, installed a pen register at its of-
fice to track telephone numbers dialed to the victim of a robbery and 
threatening phone calls.229 Law enforcement did not get a search warrant 
before the pen register was installed.230 The pen register eventually led to 
an arrest; however, the defendant moved to suppress all information de-
rived from the pen register on the grounds that its use constituted a war-
rantless search.231 The Supreme Court held that the use of the pen regis-
ter did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.232 
                                                            
 227. Id. 
 228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). 
 229. Id. at 737. A pen register is a device that records numbers dialed on a traditional tele-
phone. Id. at 736 n.1. 
 230. Id. at 737. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 745–46. 
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The Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]ll telephone users realize that 
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is 
through the telephone company switching equipment that their calls are 
completed.”233 Moreover, the Court stated that “[a]ll subscribers real-
ize . . . that the phone company has facilities for making permanent rec-
ords of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance 
(toll) calls on their monthly bills.”234 Because of this knowledge, the Su-
preme Court concluded that it is “too much to believe” that people “har-
bor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain se-
cret.”235 
Even further, the Supreme Court held that a privacy expectation in 
numbers dialed is not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable.’”236 This conclusion was based on the rule that “a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over 
to third parties.”237 The Court explained that individuals risk the infor-
mation they convey to third parties being disclosed to the government, 
even if the information was “revealed on the assumption that it [would] 
be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third 
party [would] not be betrayed.”238 In Smith, the defendant voluntarily 
conveyed his phone number when he placed the phone call.239 Therefore, 
there was no “search” under the Fourth Amendment because the defend-
ant expected the phone company was storing his phone number and be-
cause he voluntarily disclosed his number to the phone company.240 
Under the reasoning in Smith, it is difficult to see how a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in smartphones. Indeed, this was the exact 
concern expressed by Justice Sotomayor in Jones.241 As recently as 2006, 
a federal district court applied Smith and held that there was no privacy 
expectation in phone numbers dialed from cell phones.242 With a con-
sistent application of the doctrine, this reasoning would extend to all in-
formation shared from one’s smartphone. With more than half of all apps 
collecting personal data, a California law requiring app developers to 
clearly display privacy policies, and the major tech companies agreeing 
                                                            
 233. Id. at 742. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 743. 
 236. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
 237. Id. at 743–44 (internal citations omitted). Without explicitly naming it, the Court was 
defining and invoking the third-party doctrine. 
 238. Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1979)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 745–46. 
 241. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
 242. Beckwith v. Erie County Water Authority, 413 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (2006). 
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to allow consumers to review privacy polices before download—all with 
the knowledge that people are not deterred in continuing to download 
apps and share information—it may be “too much to believe” that people 
harbor any subjective privacy expectations in information stored in their 
smartphones.243 Society may have very well come to the point where 
people have been enticed to trade privacy for convenience.244 
Applying the third-party doctrine to all information contained in 
smartphones is not necessarily that far-fetched. In 2010, the Fifth Circuit 
held that a party may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
“subscriber information” due to the third-party doctrine.245 In United 
States v. Bynum, the defendant had no subjective privacy expectation to 
his name, email address, telephone number, and physical address because 
he “voluntarily conveyed all this information to his internet and phone 
companies . . . [and] ‘assumed the risk that th[os]e company[ies] would 
reveal [that information] to police.’”246 Sharing subscriber information is 
no different from allowing an app to access information on one’s 
smartphone in exchange for use of that app. Therefore, under the reason-
ing of Bynum, there may be no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
smartphones. 
Similarly, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, a federal 
district court in Maryland applied the third-party doctrine to GPS infor-
mation obtained from a cell phone.247 In United States v. Graham, the 
court held that GPS locations provided by cell phones248 fell squarely 
under the third-party doctrine and were subject to warrantless searches.249 
Graham provides that even without fully reexamining whether a reason-
able privacy interest in individuals’ smartphones exists, courts are will-
ing to apply the third-party doctrine to smartphone/cell phone searches. 
While Bynum and Graham are examples of the furtherance of the third-
party doctrine and not necessarily specific analyses of reasonable expec-
tations to privacy, they give notice to people to no longer expect that the 
Fourth Amendment protects their smartphones’ information. Put another 
way, the more courts widen existing warrantless search exceptions, the 
                                                            
 243. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
 244. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 245. United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010). “Subscriber information” is 
information that a user provides to a company—in this case, Yahoo—for the privilege of maintain-
ing a user profile and account. See id. at 162, 164. 
 246. Id. at 164 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)). 
 247. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012). 
 248. In this case, the GPS location was provided by the cell phone connecting to regional tow-
ers, not through modern GPS technology. Id. at 387. 
 249. Id. at 400. 
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more people should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
smartphones to begin with. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The courts’ jurisprudence and scholars’ writings on reasonable ex-
pectations to privacy in smartphones are unsatisfactory. These sources 
either simply assume that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy or 
do not give the question adequate analysis. While the Supreme Court 
itself has avoided the issue, concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and 
Alito open the door for lower courts and scholars to take up the task. 
However, the topic is still largely under-examined. 
In light of advancements in smartphone technology, how people use 
their smartphones, and what people give up in exchange for such uses, 
courts need to reexamine whether there is any longer a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the smartphone era.250 An initial application of the 
reasonable expectation test, à la the third-party doctrine, suggests that 
there may not be any such expectation. Courts and scholars need to step 
back, take notice of the important changes in smartphone use and tech-
nology, and carefully address the important question of whether there is, 
in fact, a reasonable expectation of privacy in smartphones. 
                                                            
 250. Exactly how the courts should rule on this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For an 
interesting discussion on the various methods the courts could use to determine reasonable expecta-
tions, see Daniel T. Pesciotta, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st 
Century, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187 (2012). 
